A posthumous legislative victory
President Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 18. The House passed it 262–159 and the Senate 86–11. Named for the senator who built its coalition before his death in July, the law authorizes tariffs of up to 100% on countries buying significant volumes of Russian energy, with China and India at the center of the debate.
Why This Matters
Traditional sanctions target the seller; secondary tariffs target the customer. That can reach deeper into Russia’s oil revenue, but it also turns sanctions enforcement into a confrontation with economies far larger than Russia’s. The measure gives Trump negotiating leverage over Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi at once. It also gives him discretion, so the signature is the beginning of the policy rather than proof the maximum tariff will be imposed.
Historical parallel
The United States has used secondary sanctions to isolate Iran by threatening firms and banks with loss of U.S. market access. Applying tariffs to major sovereign buyers of Russian oil is broader and potentially more inflationary. During earlier oil sanctions, waivers and price caps tried to reduce revenue without removing supply. A 100% tariff could instead fracture trade if buyers retaliate or re-route commerce.
Who wins and who loses
Ukraine gains a stronger pressure tool and a bipartisan signal of support. U.S. producers could gain if Russian barrels lose buyers. Consumers and manufacturers could lose if retaliation raises import costs. India faces a particularly difficult balance between discounted energy and U.S. market access; China has both the scale and political willingness to resist. Russia will seek opaque shipping, intermediaries and non-dollar settlement.
What happens next
Implementation guidance, exemptions and presidential waivers will reveal whether the law is a deterrent or an operating policy. A calibrated scenario starts below 100% and escalates against entities that increase purchases. A maximal scenario triggers retaliation and higher prices. The decisive evidence will be Russian export revenue, not the headline tariff rate.
Sources: iHeart / WTAG report. Facts and figures are a fixed September 19, 2026 reporting snapshot and do not update live.